English: U.S. Army armored personnel carrier (APC) spraying Agent Orange during the Vietnam War (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

English: U.S. Huey helicopter spraying Agent Orange over Vietnam (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

English: Large stacks of 55-gallon drums filled with Agent Orange. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Air force C-130 airplane spraying chemical dispersants on the Gulf of Mexico oil spill in May 2010 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Sign protesting use of toxic "Corexit&quo...

Sign protesting use of toxic "Corexit" chemical dispersant in the BP Gulf of Mexico oil disaster, at the Bastille Day Tumble, French Quarter, New Orleans. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

In the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, heavy sheens of oil covered large areas of Prince William Sound. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Poor passage planning and deviation from the plan can lead to groundings, ship damage and cargo loss. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Birds killed as a result of oil from the Exxon Valdez spill. Photo courtesy of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

"Very, Very Sick Population" Due to BP Oil and Dispersants, say Medical Experts, Scientists

On April 12, 2013, Bridge the Gulf and the Gulf Coast Fund convened a roundtable discussion with people working to bring attention to a public health crisis they have seen unfold since the BP disaster. Participants included a mother from a coastal Louisiana town overcome by chronic illness, a doctor, two scientists and a lawyer.

.....recurring symptoms including “headaches, recorded by 80-90% of those surveyed, dizziness 72%, respiratory impacts 70%” as well as “fatigue, skin lesions, memory loss, confusion, depression, neurological damage, decreased lung function, cardiovascular impacts, mental health impacts and many, many other acute and chronic health symptoms."

Three years after the BP disaster, the crude oil continues to be present in the subsurface waters of the Gulf of Mexico and continues to wash on shore on a daily basis into the wetlands, marshes, estuaries and beaches. Coastal community members and commercial fishermen continue to be exposed to the very toxic chemicals that are in the crude and continue to be made ill by their ongoing, chronic exposure to the crude oil in the environment in which they live, earn a living and recreate.”

Monique Harden with Advocates for Environmental Human Rights sees an underlying problem in our legal system that puts the burden of proof on those that are ill, to prove “that exposure to the BP crude oil and/or Corexit (dispersant), or the combination of both, caused the specific diagnosed physical illness.” And yet, “There’s no science to make that connection. But this is the burden that’s put on Kindra’s family and so many other folks in the Gulf region. And it’s a burden that’s sanctioned and entrenched in the legal system when it comes to environmental disasters like this one.”

Harden explains that in other famous cases where victims of toxic exposure were compensated – Vietnam Veterans exposed to Agent Orange and survivors of the September 11th World Trade Center collapse and cleanup – the victims were not required to make this causal link between exposure and illness. Kenneth Feinberg, who was hired by BP to oversee the claims process, also oversaw those landmark cases. In the case of the World Trade Center, “all people had to show was that they were in the vicinity where the exposure occurred and that they had a medical diagnosis of an illness – not a medical diagnosis of a causal connection, but just a medical diagnosis of an illness and they were able to receive compensation. In the BP disaster, Ken Feinberg turned his back on all of that incredible work, in terms of finding a reasonable way to compensate people who have suffered physically from exposure.”

Scientist Dr. Rikki Ott lived through the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill and traveled the Gulf Coast for a year after the BP disaster, researching symptoms in the general public. What she witnessed convinced her that the region is experiencing a public health crisis related to the oil disaster. She has been particularly worried about the combined impact of the crude oil and the chemical dispersant, Corexit, used to break up the BP oil. Ott explains, “Since the 1970s it has been known that the combination of dispersants and crude oil is more toxic to the ecosystem than oil alone.” (A report released today by the Goverment Accountability project backs up that claim.) She says that while underplaying the potential health impacts of the oil and dispersant, the industry acknowledges the extreme toxicity of the dispersant in the preparation given to workers handling the chemicals, “Workers who use Corexit were given 40 hours of training and were required to wear complete protection against these compounds.”

Fri, 2013-04-19 10:34

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Controlling Rival Hypothesis Underlies US Proposal of Talks to Iran
Tuesday, April 30, 2013

The United States has not given up its confrontational approach to Iran and is not ready to pursue an approach of interaction with the Islamic Republic yet. As for their offer of talks with Iran, they have frequently received Iran's message that any positive answer by Iranian side to the United States’ offer of talks depends on a tangible change in the US behavior, not a simple change of position.

Enemies Seek to Fuel Hostility between Shia and Sunni Muslims

Ayatollah Khamenei called for the continued condemnation of desecration of the holy shrine of the ancient Muslim figure Hujr ibn Adi, a companion of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH).

    The leader hailed the Shia community for its response to the incident, saying they showed that they are not deceived by the enemy plots. He also praised the Sunni brothers who condemned the incident.

    Ayatollah Khamenei further warned that such sacrilegious acts could spread if Muslim scholars and political figures fail to condemn them.

    “Muslims, especially elites and scientific, political and religious figures in the Muslim world should fulfill their duty towards this evil mindset and prevent the spread of sedition between Muslims.”

Iran Condemns Israeli Military Aggression against Syria

Boston Bomb Attacks: Beginning of a New Era for Cooperation between US and Russia

It is very weird that two suspects in Boston blasts are Chechens because Islamists in Chechnya and Dagestan, both in Caucasus region, have never embarked on terrorist operations outside Russia. Even inside Russia, their operations have been bound by specific limits, mostly focused on the areas immediately around Dagestan and Chechnya as well as some big cities in Russia. The radical Islamists in Chechnya have so far shown no interest in fighting against the United States. The main reason for this is firstly their lack of education and regional tunnel vision, and secondly, intense and violent conflict with the Russian army. The type of control that the Russian government sways over this region (through local security forces, especially the Kadyrov family), and the economic situation of this mountainous region also play a part. The entry into the United States of Chechens and their possible role in the aforesaid bomb attacks may probably indicate new activities and new translocation of forces by the relatively imaginary Al-Qaeda terrorist network.

I personally believe that such activities cannot be carried out in the United States unless through full cooperation of collaborators inside the United States. In fact, the suitable ground for such terrorist activities is provided and the way for the implementation of such plots is usually paved by the political forces which are against the American government. Such activities, therefore, are only possible through collaboration of certain parts of the US security forces because the control system in that country is powerful enough not to allow for the implementation of such operations. Terrorist scenarios in the United States are usually very suspicious and normal information which abounds about such operations in other places is usually lacking in the United States. Take Russia as an example. Following a terrorist operations in Moscow (against Dubrovka Theater), or in Makhachkala (Dagestan), or in Grozny (Chechnya), or even after the Beslan school hostage crisis, all culprits involved in those operations were identified and all methods used as well as operating teams and other similar information came into the light in a short period of time.

.....reach the conclusion that the presence of two Chechens in Boston as the main masterminds behind the twin blasts without any kind of organizational relationship to terrorist organizations inside Chechnya can be only part of a premeditated scenario. The main goal of that scenario is, in fact, boosting the cooperation between the United States and Russia against Muslims living along Russia’s southern borders up to its border with China’s Xinjiang province.

Saudi Arabia and Syria Crisis: A Return to Ambiguity

Since Saudi Arabia officially lent its support to the armed opposition fighting against the government of the Syrian President Bashar Assad in August 2011, and King Abdullah recalled his ambassador from Damascus after bitter criticism of Assad, Riyadh has been following a special approach to crisis in Syria. Before that development, Riyadh was standing in-between as it only provided Assad’s opposition with mainly media support while remaining actually silent in diplomatic and political fronts. As a result, there was no specific framework available within which the main approach of Riyadh to the crisis in Syria could be ascertained. This situation continued until the Al-Nusra Front, one of the offshoots of Al-Qaeda terrorist group, gained more and more power as the Syria crisis escalated to new levels, and finally turned into a major player in Syrian developments. This development was followed by increased ambiguity in Saudi Arabia’s policy toward Syria, so that, the possibility of explaining and predicting the policy of Riyadh toward Syria was reduced to a minimum.

One of the major goals that Saudi Arabia sought to achieve by supporting the armed opposition in Syria was to weaken the anti-Israeli resistance axis in the region and reduce its maneuvering power over major regional issues. The reason for the adoption of a new policy was rooted in regional rivalries between Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran as a result of which Saudi Arabia’s policy toward Syria gradually changed course from a policy of détente to overt confrontation with Damascus. One year into the Syria crisis, Saudi Arabia’s policy toward Syria underwent a gradual change as a result of which, although confrontation with the government of Assad continued, the support offered for the Syria opposition was shrouded in more mystery and became more intricate. As a result of that development, new doubts were evident in Saudi Arabia’s interaction with the opposition forces in Syria.

.....criticized some religious preachers who were trying to encourage Saudi youth to go to Syria and fight alongside the insurgents. King Abdullah not only urged the clerics to stop anti-Syria propaganda, but also asked for harsher punishments against those who “misguided” the Saudi youth. Before that and in June 2012, the Saudi Board of Senior Ulema had issued a fatwa in which it noted that “declaring Jihad in Syria” without the permission from the Saudi government was haram [religiously forbidden]. Such developments clearly indicated that the Saudi regime fears a repetition of bomb attacks and the insecurity which was rife in the country back in 2003 and 2004.

Encouraging the Saudi youth to go to Syria for Jihad, which often meant their membership in the most radical Salafi groups in that country and getting familiar with their ideology, has been associated with fears about the situation in Saudi Arabia when they would return home.

The Iranian Nuclear Issue: What’s at Stake for the BRICS

The controversy over Iran’s nuclear activities has at least as much to do with the future of international order as it does with nonproliferation. For this reason, all of the BRICS have much at stake in how the Iranian nuclear issue is handled.

    Conflict over Iran’s nuclear program is driven by two different approaches to interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); these approaches, in turn, are rooted in different conceptions of international order. Which interpretation of the NPT ultimately prevails on the Iranian nuclear issue will go a long way to determine whether a rules-based view of international order gains ascendancy over a policy-oriented approach in which the goals of international policy are defined mainly by America and its partners. And that will go a long way to determine whether rising non-Western states emerge as true power centers in a multipolar world, or whether they continue, in important ways, to be subordinated to hegemonic preferences of the West—and especially the United States.

    The NPT is appropriately understood as a set of three bargains among signatories: non-weapons states commit not to obtain nuclear weapons; countries recognized as weapons states (America, Russia, Britain, France, and China) commit to nuclear disarmament; and all parties agree that signatories have an “inalienable right” to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. One approach to interpreting the NPT gives these bargains equal standing; the other holds that the goal of nonproliferation trumps the other two.

    There have long been strains between weapons states and non-weapons states over nuclear powers’ poor compliance with their commitment to disarm. Today, though, disputes about NPT interpretation are particularly acute over perceived tensions between blocking nuclear proliferation and enabling peaceful use of nuclear technology. This is especially so for fuel cycle technology, the ultimate “dual use” capability—for the same material that fuels power, medical, and research reactors can, at higher levels of fissile isotope concentration, be used in nuclear bombs.

Those who believe nonproliferation trumps the NPT’s other goals claim that there is no treaty-based “right” to enrich, and that weapons states and others with nuclear industries should decide which non-weapons states can possess fuel cycle technologies. From these premises, the George W. Bush administration sought a worldwide ban on transferring fuel cycle technologies to countries not already possessing them. Since this effort failed, Washington has pushed the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group to make such transfers conditional on recipients’ acceptance of the Additional Protocol to the NPT—an instrument devised at U.S. instigation in the 1990s to enable more intrusive and proactive inspections in non-weapons states.

Pre-emptive War with Iran and the Proverbial 800 Pound Gorilla

peculations about air strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities have become routine in the western media. Presumably, these facilities will be targeted in an attack by the Israelis or by a joint Israeli-American taskforce as though enemy aircraft can fly into Iranian airspace unopposed. Most of these speculations leave out several important points. The first is that any attack on Iranian enrichment facilities would amount to attacking Iran with a “dirty bomb,” that is, with a “radiological weapon” that combines the explosive charge of the bunker-buster ordinance with the radioactive material contained in the targeted facilities. Numerous official and semi-official western studies agree that such an attack would release massive amounts of highly radioactive elements into the region’s environment, and would cause “hundreds of thousands” of short-term and long-term casualties as a result of exposure to nuclear radiation. The Union of Concerned Scientists, which utilized a model developed by the Pentagon, states that following an attack on the Natanz facility near Isfahan, some 3,000,000 civilians will perish in the first couple of weeks, and in the weeks to follow, the prevailing winds will carry the radiation to some 35 million others in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.(see video, See also).

    The adverse political effects of such an event hardly need explanation. This brings me to another neglected point. The Range of options that are open to Iran in case of a radiological attack is not adequately considered. It is true that Iran does not have a nuclear weapon. But it is also true that Iran does have the capability to build a “dirty bomb” if she is ever attacked by one. The moment the country is attacked by a “radiological weapon,” a red line would have been crossed. No one who knows anything about Iran’s history and culture believes that the Iranian armed forces are going to sit back and take it all on the chin. According to the IAEA, Iran possesses thousands of tons of Uranium hexafluoride (called “hex” in the nuclear industry). This is a highly toxic substance that forms grey crystals at standard temperature and pressure, is highly corrosive to most metals, and reacts violently with water (see Wikipedia: Uranium hexafluoride). If Iran is attacked by “dirty bombs” Iranians have the option of returning the favour by striking back with “dirty bombs” of their own. In other words, any attack on Iranian nuclear installations would be matched by a devastating attack upon Israel and her allies in the region, all of whom are well within reach of Iranian drones and missiles. A missile, armed with a radiological warhead, even if intercepted in the air, would be as destructive as one that lands.

    Missile defence against such weapons would be meaningless because they devastate regardless of whether they land or are shot down.
A pre-emptive radiological attack on Iran would have another casualty on the Israeli side: namely, Israel’s “special relationship” with the U.S. Iranian leaders have repeatedly stated that if attacked, the Iranian armed forces will react by assaulting the fifth fleet with thousands of manned and unmanned speedboats and other lethal vehicles, and will also target all U.S. bases in the region by its missiles. There will inevitably be U.S. casualties, some resulting from the radiation contamination generated by the bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities in the first place. It is not unreasonable to assume that in time, various illnesses and birth defects that are normally associated with exposure to radiation will take their political toll. Before long, the war-weary population of the United States would question if the U.S. should have suffered all the carnage in yet another unnecessary war provoked by the Israelis and their American lobby.

    Therefore, the question that the AIPAC and the Israeli strategists might want to contemplate is: “how many twenty-somethings with radiation sickness would it take to end the cherished special relationship between the U.S. and Israel?” Is it worth risking the loss of the vastly preferable existing balance of power by advocating a pre-emptive war on the bogus grounds that Iran presents an existential threat to Israel? The existential threat to Israel does not come from the Iranian military; it comes from Israelis’ own chutzpah.

    No matter from which angle one views the problem of rushing into a military confrontation with Iran, the outcomes appear horrifying. The potential disasters associated with pursuing non-diplomatic solutions are too numerous and too dangerous to risk.

US One of the Main Violators of Human Rights Principles
ran’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast has criticized the politicized and double standard approach of the US toward the issue of human rights.

    In its annual human rights report released on April, the US State Department accused countries such as Iran of clamping down on rights activities.

    In reaction to the report, Mehmanparast said the US is one of the main “violators of the most basic principles of human rights and international law.”

    “It would be better for the US government to be responsible for its human rights performance in the field instead of continuing with its wrong and repetitious behaviour of accusing other countries,” he said.

    “The politicized approach and the adoption of double standards by the US on human rights in the world is not a new issue and has turned into the political tradition for the country," he added.

    The Iranian official pointed to numerous human rights violations by the US including support for the terrorist Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) and removing it from the list of terrorist groups, the establishment of illegal and extraterritorial detention centers, torture and human rights violations in Guantanamo prison, and the brutal massacre of civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
He added that the abduction of citizens of other countries and illegal rendition flights, violence against immigrants, crackdown on anti- Wall Street protests, harassment of Muslims, racial discrimination, and the bad situation of prisoners in the US are other instances of human rights violation by the US.

Controlling Rival Hypothesis Underlies US Proposal of Talks to Iran
The issue of imposing sanctions on Iran is no more related to the nuclear dossier of Iran, but the United States is actually aiming to use sanctions as a means of pushing Iran out of international energy markets. In other words, sanctions against Iran should be enforced in such a way as to make way for the regulation of global energy prices in order to render the new US technologies for the production of fossil fuels economically feasible.

    From this viewpoint, the Americans are trying to define their proposal of direct talks to Iran within the framework of strategic changes in their foreign policy and take good advantage of it. Therefore, proposing negotiations as a tactic is just part of the road map they are currently following. In practice, however, the United States has not been able to use the true capacity of diplomacy in order to engage in constructive interaction with Iran. By taking an instrumental approach to the best way for interacting with Iran, the United States has practically given birth to fundamental doubts in this regard which have further increased the height of the distrust wall which exists between the two sides.
another part of the US policy, which will be implemented in later stages of its plan, is to control such global rivals as China. In the meantime, by redefining its position in determining the global energy price strategy, Washington is actually trying to block Russia’s strategy and prevent Moscow from having any claim to be the leading supplier of energy in the world.

    Therefore, the concept of energy security in the Middle East will be defined through a major shift in the arrangement of rivaling powers in the near future.

Marking Persian Gulf Day
The beginning of 1930s was a turning point in the history of efforts for changing the name of Persian Gulf when Sir Charles Bellgrave, the British diplomatic envoy on the Iranian island of Mishmahig also known as Bahrain, opened a file for the change in the name of Persian Gulf and proposed the issue to the British Foreign Office.

    Even before the response of the British Foreign Office, he used the fake name.
Besides all the disputes fabricated over the name of Persian Gulf, the United Nations with its 22 Arab member countries has on two occasions officially declared the unalterable name of the sea between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula as the Persian Gulf.

Iran Remains Completely Committed to NPT
ran’s Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Ali-Asghar Soltanieh warns against the serious threat Israel’s nuclear arsenal poses to global peace and security.

    Addressing the second session of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee in Geneva, Soltanieh said that allowing the Israeli regime to continue nuclear weapons production without any punishment would have serious of consequences for regional and international peace and security.

    “Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are both sides of one coin. Nuclear-armed countries have diverted the attention of the international community from their constant measures [taken to achieve] nuclear weapons under the pretext of non-proliferation,” he added.

    As a responsible country that has no nuclear weapons and carries out merely peaceful nuclear activities, the Islamic Republic of Iran will remain completely committed to NPT objectives.

    “We believe that full implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty without discrimination plays a fundamental role in promoting international peace and security,” the Iranian envoy pointed out.

    He once again renewed Iran’s call for nuclear disarmament weapons based on the NPT regulations, saying nuclear countries should not cooperate with non-nuclear states/entities or non-signatories to the treaty.

Ayatollah Khamenei Warns against Enemy Plots in Islamic Awakening Movements
Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei has warned against enemy plots to turn Islamic Awakening movements into sectarian and ethnic conflicts.

    “Western and Zionist intelligence services are seriously and relentlessly pursuing this plot with the help of petrodollars and traitorous politicians from the East of Asia to the North of Africa and particularly in the Arab region,” Ayatollah Khamenei said.

    Referring to the situation in Libya, Tunisia, Syria, Pakistan, Iraq and Lebanon, the Leader said, “The propaganda by the West and the mercenary and dependent regional media portrays the devastating war in Syria as a Shia-Sunni conflict, creating a safety margin for the Zionists and the enemies of the resistance movements in Syria and Lebanon.”

    “This is while the two sides of the conflict in Syria are the proponents and opponents of anti-Israel resistance, not Shias and Sunnis,” Ayatollah Khamenei added.

    “‘Insistence on Islamic principles’ and ‘people’s presence in the scene’ are the two key and main factors that will neutralize all the enemies’ plots, ploys and deceit,” the Leader said.

    “Islamic Awakening is a truth whose signs can be seen almost all across the Muslim world.”

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Proof to Illegality of Referring Iran's Nuclear Dossier from IAEA to Security Council (Part 1)
The nuclear standoff between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued from 2003 to 2006. In that period, Iran on the one hand, submitted 1,000-page reports about its nuclear activities to the IAEA announcing that Tehran’s nuclear program is not incompatible with the Islamic Republic’s obligations as per the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, the IAEA, on the other hand, continuously accused Iran of “secrecy.” The supervisory body claimed time and again that Iran should “reveal” information about its nuclear activities. As the conflict between the IAEA's claims and Iran's nuclear achievements continued, Tehran started to manufacture its own centrifuges and produce the “yellow cake.” As a result, the IAEA Board of Governors met in September 2005 to adopt a resolution which asked Iran to pass the Additional Protocol to the NPT in its parliament, stop its uranium enrichment activities and resume talks with the three European countries, known as EU3 or troika [including Britain, Germany and France]. Iran, however, noted that the Board of Governors’ resolution was illegal, urging the IAEA to take a purely technical and legal approach to Iran's nuclear program.

    In response, the IAEA noted that while reaffirming lack of evidence to prove diversion in Iran's nuclear energy program toward military purposes, it was still unable to verify the peaceful nature of those activities of which the IAEA was unaware. Therefore, the IAEA said, it was not able to categorically rule out lack of any diversion in Iran's nuclear program! The IAEA also alleged that based on the Article 8 of the Safeguards Agreement signed between Iran and the IAEA, Iran was obliged to provide the IAEA with information about both the nuclear materials it possessed, and the facilities where those materials were supposed to be used. The IAEA also noted that due to Iran's background for “secrecy,” it was not able to verify those activities which Iran had carried out without public declaration. Therefore, on the strength of Article 10 of the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA, the nuclear watchdog asserted that it was in a position to refer Iran's nuclear dossier to the United Nations Security Council.
The decision to refer Iran's nuclear case to the United Nations Security Council is bogged by a number of legal problems which have received less attention than they actually deserved. What follows is a brief discussion of those problems.

    First: “Non-compliance” of Iran was never proven

    According to the Statute of the IAEA the precondition for reporting Iran’s dossier to the Security Council should be noncompliance of the Iranian government with the NPT or the Safeguard Agreement between Iran and the IAEA. However, since the noncompliance of Iran with the said agreement was never proven, reporting Iran's case to the Security Council has been both non-legal and illegal.

    According to Paragraph C, Article 12, of the IAEA Statute, the Agency’s “inspectors shall report any noncompliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any noncompliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the noncompliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.” According to this article, verification of noncompliance (diversion toward military purposes) is the necessary requisite for reporting a case to the Security Council. The task for the verification of the noncompliance has been assigned, according to this article, to the “IAEA inspectors” who should inform the Board of Governors of any noncompliance through the Director General of the Agency.
It is both clear and upheld by historical backdrop of Iran's nuclear case that in none of the Agency’s reports has been a mention of “noncompliance” of Iran or “diversion from peaceful nuclear activities” by Iran. On the contrary, “Mohamed ElBaradei,” the former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, had frequently emphasized on lack of any diversion in the nuclear activities and materials which had been declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The question is whether or not the mere inability to make sure about peaceful nature of a member state’s nuclear activities could be good ground to allow the Board of Governors to make the decision about reporting that member state to the UN Security Council?

    On the other hand, the IAEA claims that noncompliance of Iran with its obligations has been verified because the Islamic Republic has not paid attention to the IAEA's decisions, including the Agency’s demand on Tehran to suspend uranium enrichment and approve the Additional Protocol as per the resolutions adopted by the Board of Governors. As a result, the IAEA argues, Iran's behavior is a case of noncompliance with the Agency’s rules and regulations and a cause of reporting the country’s nuclear case to the Security Council. Now, the main question is whether or not the Charter of the United Nations has specified that it is an undeniable right of the states to make the final decision about membership in international bodies and various regimes formulated by those bodies? If so, how a state could be forced into accepting a treaty or accede to an international organization? Can a state’s refusal to accede to such organizations or endorse their treaties, the decision about which has been left to the discretion of every state, constitute an instance of noncompliance with those treaties?

    Second: Absence of any issue which falls within competence of the Security Council

    Another condition for reporting Iran's case to the United Nations Security Council by the IAEA is to verify that there is a threat posed to international peace and security. This issue has been clearly stipulated in the Statute of the UN nuclear watchdog. According to Paragraph 4, Article 3 of the Statute of the IAEA, “…if in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security….”

    Therefore, the remarks by director general of the IAEA about lack of diversion and peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear energy program clearly prove that these activities pose no threat to international peace and security and, therefore, do not allow for the use of force against Iran. In better words, Iran's nuclear activities do not fall under the text of articles 40 and 41 of Charter VII of the United Nations Charter because those activities do not involve anything which could be considered a threat to international peace and security, including starting a war, breaching a cease-fire, or threatening the neighboring countries. On the contrary, the main discrepancy between Iran and the IAEA is a legal dispute about the interpretation and implementation of Article 4 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for which a solution has been predicted in the Agency’s instruments where a mechanism has been thought of to forge mutual agreement in such cases.
....the IAEA director general has noted in all his reports that the IAEA has been able to verify no diversion in nuclear material and activities declared by Iran and has found no evidence to prove that those material and activities have been diverted toward military purposes.
According to the Statute of the IAEA and the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA, in order for the UN Security Council to be able to enter a case, the IAEA Board of Governors should adopt a resolution which should also provide a thorough account of the case. This procedure has not been observed with regard to Iran. The decisions made by the Board of Governors clearly show that the aforesaid procedure has not been respected by the member states of the Board. Therefore, the measure taken by the Board of Governors through its resolution adopted on February 4, 2006, as well as the director general’s report to the Security Council on March 8, 2006, have been based on political motivations, and have not been based on any principles of the IAEA Statute as well as the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA. Therefore, bringing the Security Council into the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear case has been totally incompatible with the organizational requirements as well as the procedural work of the IAEA on the basis of its Statute and the Safeguards Agreement because essential conditions and fundamental legal provisions for getting the Security Council involved in cases discussed by the IAEA have not been observed.

What's at Stake for Non-Western Powers in the Iranian Nuclear Issue