Avian Botulism Investigation (Photo credit: USFWS Mountain Prairie)
Experts discuss future priorities for brucellosis control in Kenya (Photo credit: ILRI)
Vitamin Line-Up (Photo credit: Earthworm)
USAMRIID Logo (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Kantubek and Vozrozhdeniye villages on Vozrozhdeniya Island, Aral Sea, Uzbekistan. former secret Sovjet biological warfare laboratory in Kantubek and Vozrozhdeniye support facility drawn by Julo on the NASA satellite photo (shot Nov.8th, 1994) (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
English: Gruinard River. In the background is Gruinard Island, famous as the 'anthrax island' where research into biological warfare was conducted during World War II. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
M-17 nuclear, biological and chemical warfare mask and hood (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Alter Nature: My biological (r)evolution - Bob Coenradi - My Biological Warfare (2011) (Photo credit: KunstinLimburg.be)
Chemical-Biological Warfare Drills (Photo credit: Israel Defense Forces)
A Glob on Nutraceuticals and Vitamins within the quagmire of History and Nonsense
“When the U.S. biological warfare program ended in 1969 it had developed seven mass-produced, battle-ready biological weapons in the form of agents that cause: anthrax, tularemia, brucellosis, Q-fever, VEE, and botulism.[10] In addition staphylococcal enterotoxin B was produced as an incapacitating agent.[10] In addition to the agents that were ready to be used, the U.S. program conducted research into the weaponization of more than 20 other agents. They included: smallpox, EEE and WEE, AHF, Hantavirus, BHF, Lassa fever, glanders,[30] melioidosis,[30] plague, yellow fever,psittacosis, typhus, dengue fever, Rift Valley fever (RVF), CHIKV, late blight of potato, rinderpest, Newcastle disease, bird flu, and the toxin ricin.[31]
Mark Collins – The US, Iraq, and COIN (Good Things?)
Lots more of how Western armies may try to work in the future–and how their minds work:
‘Ten questions about the future of counterinsurgency and stabilization ops (I)
…The trend in staff colleges around the world is to return to the proper business of soldiering — major combat operations. This trend is bolstered by a belief that our skills in this area have atrophied over the last decade or so of constant patrolling in the deserts, towns, and mountains of obscure foreign countries of which we never really knew much about, or cared much for.
Notwithstanding the wishes of senior commanders, who make much of the fact that the we in Western militaries must not simply press the reset button and dump our experiences of the last decade, it seems probable that the need to train for “old school” major combat operations will probably lead to this happening in practice — because people train to be good at what they are going to be assessed on, which in the near future is going to be old fashioned warfighting, however it is currently described…
As this belief grows stronger (and it will — especially after 2014) there will be a tendency to put away the lessons of the period of 2001-2014, in a part of our brain that we do not choose to look at very often. And then, when in years to come we find ourselves fighting another similar campaign in another part of the world that we also know little of and care even less for, we will find ourselves having to go through the same painful process of learning and adaption that we have experienced over the last decade…
There is an even more frightening prospect than this, however. What if we don’t actually learn the correct lessons at all from our experiences?..’
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/02/06/ten_questions_about_the_future_of_counterinsurgency_and_stabilization_ops_i
Read on, and see also these relevant posts:
http://cdfai3ds.wordpress.com/2013/02/05/mark-collins-what-the-canadian-forces-esp-army-shouldmight-do/
http://cdfai3ds.wordpress.com/2013/02/05/douglas-e-delaney-the-chalkboard-battlefield/
Mark Collins
‘Ten questions about the future of counterinsurgency and stabilization ops (I)
…The trend in staff colleges around the world is to return to the proper business of soldiering — major combat operations. This trend is bolstered by a belief that our skills in this area have atrophied over the last decade or so of constant patrolling in the deserts, towns, and mountains of obscure foreign countries of which we never really knew much about, or cared much for.
Notwithstanding the wishes of senior commanders, who make much of the fact that the we in Western militaries must not simply press the reset button and dump our experiences of the last decade, it seems probable that the need to train for “old school” major combat operations will probably lead to this happening in practice — because people train to be good at what they are going to be assessed on, which in the near future is going to be old fashioned warfighting, however it is currently described…
As this belief grows stronger (and it will — especially after 2014) there will be a tendency to put away the lessons of the period of 2001-2014, in a part of our brain that we do not choose to look at very often. And then, when in years to come we find ourselves fighting another similar campaign in another part of the world that we also know little of and care even less for, we will find ourselves having to go through the same painful process of learning and adaption that we have experienced over the last decade…
There is an even more frightening prospect than this, however. What if we don’t actually learn the correct lessons at all from our experiences?..’
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/02/06/ten_questions_about_the_future_of_counterinsurgency_and_stabilization_ops_i
Read on, and see also these relevant posts:
http://cdfai3ds.wordpress.com/2013/02/05/mark-collins-what-the-canadian-forces-esp-army-shouldmight-do/
http://cdfai3ds.wordpress.com/2013/02/05/douglas-e-delaney-the-chalkboard-battlefield/
Mark Collins
Apparently we haven’t.
One of my earliest recollections is ‘Duck and Cover’ for Air Raid Drills in elementary school.That slowly stopped when people started to realize ‘modern’ war – and I mean nukes – would be horrid to survive. Things have not improved.
There is no ‘Existential Threat’ from abroad. If we choose war as business entertainment we can undoubtedly choose to ‘justify’ doing it any way we want.
NATO and the UN are a far cry from ‘peacekeeping’ organizations. But the ‘Security Council’ owns the balance of terror.
One of my earliest recollections is ‘Duck and Cover’ for Air Raid Drills in elementary school.That slowly stopped when people started to realize ‘modern’ war – and I mean nukes – would be horrid to survive. Things have not improved.
There is no ‘Existential Threat’ from abroad. If we choose war as business entertainment we can undoubtedly choose to ‘justify’ doing it any way we want.
NATO and the UN are a far cry from ‘peacekeeping’ organizations. But the ‘Security Council’ owns the balance of terror.