oldephartte(in training): 14 April

Over 1000 Hezbollah fighters arrive in Syria to back Assad forces

Natural gas: A new duel in the Middle East

(100)The Kissinger cables’ time warp
The recently-released batch of Wikileaks cables are in many ways an eye-opener. The 1.7 million documents, including the more than 200,000 records concerning former U.S. Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, (known as “Kissinger Cables”), shed light on U.S.-Arab relations during a crucial period, that of the 1973 war, but also on the lingering legacies of more recent years.
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once Riyadh decided to cut oil supplies to the US, the Embassy’s cables were to take a less complacent tone. Without a minimum sense of respect or empathy for their “target-audiences”, diplomats cannot carry a credible message, even if they tried. With patently based notions, they cannot be the honest brokers they claim to be. On October 9th, 1973, deputy chief of mission in Jeddah, Hume A. Horan, would tell the State Department that the “Arabs are famously bad losers” and that the Israelis have an “understandable desire for revenge”.
.....As part of the political and diplomatic mores of the 1970’s, diplomatic relations during the “Kissinger era” were based on a top-down concept of power in the Arab world. American diplomats counted on Arab rulers to influence, contain or stunt public opinion trends. Opposition politicians and civil society activists were not yet part of the game. Governments on both sides had a patronizing attitude towards Arab opinions, not recognizing the legitimacy of their views.
In Cairo, in Tunis, in Rabat, in Jeddah and elsewhere, US diplomats used to think that the best way to avoid anti-American reactions was to prevent the dissemination of critical or hostile messages. Diplomats, but also intelligence officers, were involved. An April 15, 1973 cable details how an American intelligence officer complained to an Egyptian senior diplomat that pro-Palestinian stories circulating in Egyptian media were “creating an unhelpful political atmosphere”. He went on to directly request “the help of the Egyptian government in controlling the dissemination of such inflammatory statements”. The Egyptian civil servant told his American interlocutors that Egyptian media did not reflect official views and they had “the right” to report international news as they saw fit.
Some of the Arab officials tried to tell their American interlocutors, albeit “diplomatically”, that the problem was with the lack of credibility of the US government narrative. According to an October 16, 1973 cable, Tunisian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mahmoud Mestiri, told US ambassador to the UN Security Council, W. Tapley Bennett, that “he personally accepted US Government explanations regarding new arms shipments to Israel, but said that these "sophisticated explanations" were not likely to be accepted easily by people.”
A few U.S. Ambassadors tried to tell the State Department the problem was with American policies themselves (not just the narrative). Amongst them was Talcott W. Seelye, who in an October 11, 1973 cable from Tunis, told Washington: “I frankly am unable to understand why we have to move sixth fleet in current situation…. it is entirely possible that if we could just stay clear of conflict, we would come out of this war with our people and our interests in area unaffected -- and thus be in excellent position to renew our efforts with regard to a settlement.”